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Disclaimer 
Funding for the Cooperative Research Program which forms the basis for this report was 
provided to the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) by the Gulf State 
Marine Fisheries Commission (GSMFC) under the Emergency Disaster Recovery Program 
(EDRP) via Grant Number NA06NMF4540319 and CR-M-022-2006-01. 
Unless otherwise specifically stated, the information contained herein is the sole 
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thereof, assumes any responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, nor usefulness of any 
information reported in this study.  Reference herein to any specific assistance, review, or 
otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the 
LDWF or any entities thereof.  The views and opinions of the author expressed therein do not 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the methods used for 
allocating disaster funds to assist commercial fishery participants as a result of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita of 2005 and to examine alternative methods to aid in determining an efficient 
criterion for allocating public funds for fisheries assistance.  The trip ticket data managed by the 
Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries were used and analyzed using a cluster analysis. 
Results from the clustering procedures show that commercial fishermen consist of seven 
clusters, while wholesale/retail seafood dealers consist of six clusters.  The three tiers into which 
commercial fishermen were originally classified can be extended to at least eleven (11) clusters, 
made up of three (3) clusters in tier 1 and an equal number of clusters (4) clusters in tier 2 and 
tier 3.  Similarly, the original three tiers of wholesale/retail seafood dealers can be reclassified 
into at least nine (9) clusters with two clusters in tier 1, four (4) clusters in tier 2 and three (3) 
clusters in tier 3. 
As a result of the clustering reclassifications, alternative compensation plans were 
developed for the commercial fishermen and wholesale/retail seafood dealers.  These alternative 
compensation plans suggest a reallocation of disaster assistance funds among individual groups 
of fishermen and among individual groups of dealers.  We finally recommend that alternative 
classification methods should always be considered in order to select the most efficient criterion 
for allocating public funds in the future. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The Gulf of Mexico, a region that is comprised of the States of Texas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, has been battered by several tropical events of different 
magnitudes within the last decade.  In the aftermath of these tropical events, people are usually 
dislocated and economic or business activities become disrupted due to damages to private, 
commercial and public assets as well as loss of income and business revenues.   
Specifically, hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008 
caused disproportional disruptions of and damages to the coastal seafood sectors (shrimp, crab, 
oyster, wild crawfish and finfish) of the Gulf region, perhaps, because of its physical location 
and marine dependence.  Louisiana, whose seafood industry is the largest, with an annual 
dockside seafood sales or purchases valued at an average of $261 million between 2006 and 
2009 (Trip Ticket Data), and the hardest hit among the five Gulf of Mexico States, incurred a 
total economic loss of $582,660,258 (Caffey et al, 2007) from hurricanes Katrina and Rita alone.  
These damages are comprised of $103,522,186 (commercial dealers), $63,836,142 (commercial 
processors), $191,297,444 (commercial fishermen), and $224,004,486 (recreational vessels).  As 
a result of this bitter experience from hurricanes Katrina and Rita, investors more adequately 
prepared for hurricanes Gustav and Ike, resulting in a minimal amount of damage to the 
Louisiana’s seafood industry in 2008. 
However, hurricanes Katrina and Rita of 2005 brought in federal funding for the 
restoration of the Gulf of Mexico’s fishery industry.   For example, $128 million was earmarked 
for the Gulf for this purpose under the first Emergency Disaster Recovery Program (EDRP I) 
with an additional $84.9 million under EDRP II (Simpson, 2007; 2008).  Louisiana’s total share 
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of these funds was approximately $92 million.  As a result of hurricanes Gustav and Ike that 
landed in 2008, additional funds were earmarked for Louisiana resulting in a total of $132.9 
million of federal funds that have accrued to Louisiana due to hurricane disturbances since 2005.  
These dollars, provided through three separate congressional appropriations, funded a number of 
fishery recovery and assistance programs consistent with the purpose outlined by Congress. 
From the $132.9 million, a total of $15 million was earmarked for direct payments to 
fishery participants who participated in a cooperative research project via a voluntary survey to 
measure the recovery of Louisiana’s fisheries.  More than half of this money ($8 million) was 
earmarked for resident commercial fishermen who held a valid commercial fisherman license in 
2008 and had documented trip ticket landings (amount of seafood catch in pounds, sacks, etc.) 
during the period September 1, 2005 to August 31, 2008 and the remaining portion ($7 million) 
was earmarked for commercial wholesale/retail seafood dealers who held a valid commercial 
wholesale/retail dealer license in 2008 and had documented trip ticket purchases during the 
period September 1, 2005 to August 31, 2008.  Seafood landings and other trip level information 
such as length of fishing vessel (in feet), length of fishing trip (in hours), type of fishing gear, 
fishing sites (where majority of seafood catch was harvested), etc., are reported via fishery-
dependent forms or data sheets known as trip ticket forms.   
 1.1 Participation in Cooperative Research Survey 
In the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita of 2005, a cooperative research program 
or survey (COOP program or survey) was initiated to elicit fisheries information from 
participating commercial fishermen and wholesale/retail seafood dealers.  To qualify for 
participation in the cooperative research survey, in addition to holding a valid resident 
commercial license in 2008, fishermen must have had a reported total sale of seafood (shrimp, 
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oysters, crabs, fresh- and saltwater finfish and wild-caught crawfish) valued at $5,948 or more 
(i.e., the 30
th
 percentile of distribution of dockside sales) and dealers must have had a reported 
total purchases of seafood valued at $20,756 or more (i.e., the 30
th
 percentile of distribution of 
seafood purchases) between September 1, 2005 and August 31, 2008.  Seafood harvest (or 
landings) and purchases information are, by statute, mandatorily reported on trip ticket forms and 
kept in a database managed by the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF).  All 
commercial fishermen (or seafood dealers) who landed (or purchased) marine fish were eligible 
and persons who landed (or purchased) freshwater finfish and wild-caught crawfish were eligible 
only if the fishermen resided or the dealers operated in any of the 26 hurricane-impacted parishes 
or counties identified by the LDWF (Figure 1.1).  Commercial fishermen who possessed a 
certified fisherman endorsement from LDWF (having shown that commercial fishing constitutes 
50% or more of his/her earned income) and having had any level of seafood landings during the 
qualifying period received an additional $500 compensation for participating in the research 
survey. 
To facilitate smooth distribution of the federal funds for the cooperative research survey, 
individual groups of eligible fishery participants were categorized into three independent tiers 
using percentile methods.  Participants in each tier received an average amount which was 
determined by the percentile of the 3-year-averages of their revenues from seafood harvest, sales 
and purchases within the qualifying period (September 1, 2005 to August 31, 2008). 
1.1.1 Commercial Fishermen’s Participation 
 Table 1.1 shows the summary of the distribution of commercial fishermen by percentile-
based tiers including their minimum seafood sales and the amounts of the direct payments they 
received for their participation in the cooperative research survey.  There were 1,265 eligible   
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Figure 1.1  Parishes Impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: S. Armand, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, LAGISDVD, ESRI, NOAA, Nov. 15, 2010 
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Table 1.1  Distribution of Commercial Fishermen Eligible to Participate in the Cooperative 
Research Survey by Tier, Sales and Compensation 
Number of Eligible 
Fishermen 
Tier Level 
Minimum Sales 
Level 
Payment Amount Percentile 
  1,265 Tier 1 $5,948 $208.83 30
th
 
  1,581 Tier 2 $24,786 $870.22 50
th
 
  1,581 Tier 3 $108,804 $3,820.05 75
th
 
Source: LDWF Commercial Fisherman Cooperative Research Survey Packet, July 2009.  Note: A total of $8 million ($7,679,486 
plus $320,514 additional payment to individuals who possessed a certified fisherman endorsement from LDWF – 50% or more of 
earned income is from commercial fishing) was shared among the eligible fishermen.  License resident commercial fishermen 
who did not report sales or reported sales of less than $5,948 during the qualifying period are not eligible to participate. 
 
 
commercial fishermen (those between the 30
th
 and 50
th
 percentiles) in tier 1 who had seafood 
sales of between $5,948 and $24,785 during the qualifying period.   Tier 2 consisted of 1,581 
fishermen (those between the 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles) with sales of between $24,786 and 
$108,803.  Tier 3 is made up of the eligible commercial fishermen whose dockside sales were at 
or above the 75
th
 percentile and has an equal number of fishermen as tier 2 (i.e., 1,581) but with 
seafood sales of $108,804 or more. 
The amounts of compensation to individual fishermen for their participation in the 
research survey were $208.83 for tier 1, $870.22 for tier 2 and $3,820.05 for tier 3.  Table 1.2 
shows how LDWF computed these amounts, which was based on the minimum seafood sales 
within individual tiers.  For easy understanding of the computations, the columns in the table are 
labeled A to E.  The minimum levels of seafood sales by tier are presented in the second column, 
labeled column (A), while the numbers of fishermen in individual tiers are in column (B).  
Column (C) is the product of columns (A) and (B).  Entries in column (D) are calculated by 
dividing each entry in column (C) by their column total ($218,730,010).  Payments given to 
individual fishermen within their tiers (column (E)) are computed by dividing the share of funds 
for each tier by the number of fishermen in the tier. 
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Table 1.2  Allocation of Disaster Funds among Commercial Fishermen by Tier 
 
Tier 
Minimum 
Sales Level 
(A) 
Number of 
Fisherman 
(B) 
Lower Limit of 
Total Sales        
C = (A x B) 
Tier Share of 
Allocation 
D = (Ci/Ct) x SF 
Individual Share 
of Allocation 
E = (D / B) 
1 $5,948 1,265 $7,524,220 $264,171 $208.83 
2 $24,786 1,581 $39,186,666 $1,375,822 $870.22 
3 $108,804 1,581 $172,019,124 $6,039,493 $3,820.05 
Total $139,538 4,427 $218,730,010 $7,679,486 - 
Note: Basic allocation to fishermen (SF) = $7,679,486.  The rest ($320,514) was reserved for an additional payment to individuals 
who possessed a certified fisherman endorsement from LDWF (i.e., 50% or more of earned income is from commercial fishing). 
 
 
1.1.2 Commercial Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers’ Participation 
 The summary of the distribution of seafood dealers by tiers including their minimum 
seafood purchases and direct payments they received for their participation in the cooperative 
research survey is presented in Table 1.3.  Tier 1 consists of 113 eligible seafood dealers (those 
between the 30
th
 and 50
th
 percentiles of all eligible dealers) who had seafood purchases of 
between $20,756 and $67,526 during the qualifying period.   Tier 2 has 141 dealers (50
th
 
percentile to 75
th
 percentile) who purchased between $67,527 and $632,461 worth of seafood.  
There are 141 seafood dealers (75
th
 percentile or over) who had seafood purchases of $632,462 
or more in tier 3. 
The amount of compensation for participating in the research survey is $1,437.91 for tier 
1 dealers, $4,678.05 for tier 2 dealers and $43,814.97 for tier 3 dealers.  These amounts of 
compensation were based on the minimum level of seafood purchases and computed as shown in 
Table 1.4.  Aside from the difference in the total amount of allocated funds (i.e., $7 million), 
computation for the seafood dealers is similar to that of the commercial fishermen. 
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Table 1.3  Distribution of Commercial Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers Eligible to 
Participate in the Cooperative Research Survey by Tier, Purchases and Compensation 
Number of Eligible 
Dealers 
Tier Level 
Minimum 
Purchases Level 
Payment Amount Percentile 
113 Tier 1 $20,756 $1,437.91 30
th
 
141 Tier 2 $67,527 $4,678.05 50
th
 
141 Tier 3 $632,462 $43,814.97 75
th
 
Source: LDWF Wholesale / Retail Seafood Dealers Cooperative Research Survey Packet, July 2009.  Note: A total of $7 million 
was shared among the eligible dealers.  License resident wholesale / retail dealers who purchased less than $20,756 during the 
qualifying period are not eligible to participate. 
   
 
Table 1.4  Allocation of Disaster Funds among Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers by Tier 
 
Tier 
Minimum 
Purchases Level 
(A) 
Number of 
Dealers 
(B) 
Lower Limit of 
Total Purchases       
C = (A x B) 
Tier Share of 
Allocation 
D = (Ci/Ct) x SD 
Individual Share 
of Allocation 
E = (D / B) 
1 $20,756 113 $2,345,428 $162,484 $1,437.91 
2 $67,527 141 $9,521,307 $659,605 $4,678.05 
3 $632,463 141 $89,177,283 $6,177,911 $43,814.97 
Total $720,746 395 $101,044,018 $7,000,000 - 
Note: Total  allocation to seafood dealers (SD) = $7,000,000. 
 
 
 1.2 Objectives of the Study   
This study’s objectives are to evaluate the effectiveness of the percentile methods used 
for allocating disaster funds to the eligible fishery participants who were affected by Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita and to examine alternative methods to aid in determining an efficient criterion 
for allocating public funds earmarked for fisheries assistance program. 
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 1.3 Justification of the Study 
 Classification by fisheries (shrimp, crab, oyster, finfish and wild crawfish), in which 
fishery participants (commercial fishermen and seafood dealers) participate, is the major known 
form of classification that has existed not only in Louisiana fisheries but fisheries of other states, 
regions or countries.  This classification scheme has existed mainly for fishery management or 
policy purposes.  The benefits of management-oriented classification of fishery participants can, 
however, be less optimal when socioeconomic and fishery restoration dimensions become 
important aspects of management especially after the occurrence of a devastating natural 
disaster. 
In the aftermath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 
2008 when federal funding was earmarked to restore Louisiana fisheries and assist fisheries 
participants, the percentile method was used to partition into tiers the commercial fishermen and 
the wholesale/retail seafood dealers, who are eligible to participate in the voluntary cooperative 
research survey.  However, this method is limited in three ways: First, it provides a one-
dimensional clustering, that is, it is solely based on one variable (seafood sales or purchases).  
The use of only one variable may be inadequate to capture relevant issues related to commercial 
fisheries such as differences in fishing efforts (e.g., fishing experience, types and sizes of fishing 
boats and fishing gear, number and length of fishing trips, etc.) and variation in fisheries related 
risks including disaster-related losses.   
Second, the percentile method appears to have created inconsistent variations among the 
ranges of the levels of seafood sales and levels of seafood purchases.  Third, it also creates 
inconsistent variations among payment amounts to the individual groups of fishermen and 
dealers.  For example, a seafood dealer who was $1 short of being a member of tier 3 would fall 
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in tier 2 and lose approximately $39,136.  Such a dealer would ridicule this compensation plan 
and this might explain the reason why some participants declined to participate in the research 
survey.  Presuming they possess important and sizable information, the omission of their 
information in the data analysis might distort the results, resulting in misleading conclusions 
which might affect future studies.  In this study, the use of a two-dimensional clustering is 
considered which is expected to provide a better classification procedure. 
 1.4 Organization of the Study 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the conceptual 
framework and review of literature for the study and Chapter 3 presents a discussion of the data 
and the analytical procedures.  Chapter 4 contains the results and discussion, while Chapter 5 
presents the summary and the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 - Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 
This chapter describes relevant concepts regarding approaches to classifying objects and 
reviews past studies in which clustering classification tools have been applied. 
 2.1 Conceptual Framework 
Partitioning objects or people into distinct groups having homogenous characteristics has 
been performed to a large extent in many professions.  This is often done in order to make 
informed decisions on how best to efficiently and equitably allocate scarce resources within or 
among the different subgroups and in order to perform further analyses on the groups.  
Classification schemes that have been used in the literature for partitioning into subgroups 
include percentile methods, graphical aids such as scatter plots and stem-and-leaf plots, 
discriminant analysis, clustering methods, multidimensional scaling, etc.  Choosing an 
appropriate classification scheme depends on the task, the number of measured variables that is 
involved in the decision making process and available resources.        
Cluster analysis involves techniques that produce classifications from data that are 
initially unclassified and, in most cases, from data having more than one measured variable.  It is 
performed using algorithms that use a measure of distance (similarity or dissimilarity) between 
two individual observations and then proceeds to measure the similarity or dissimilarity between 
two clusters of observations.   Johnson (1998) described three forms of these distance measures.  
These are: 
(1) Euclidean or Ruler Distance: 
       2
1
'
srsrrs xxxxd      
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(2) Standardized Ruler Distance: 
    2
1
'
srsrrs zzzzd   
 
(3) The Mahalanobis Distance: 
     2
1
1'
srsrrs xxxxd 
  
 
where drs is the distance between observations xr and xs (or points zr and zs) in the p-dimensional 
space, z is the standardized Z score for the variable x and   is the within cluster variance-
covariance matrix.  The use of the first two distance measures is prevalent in past studies, 
perhaps, because the variance-covariance matrix required for the Mahalanobis distance is 
difficult to generate.   
2.1.1 Properties of Distance Measures 
 The choice of the distance measures must be made carefully depending on the type of 
study, for findings from a clustering analysis can be highly sensitive to the distance measure and 
clustering algorithms used.  Research opinions are divided, however, as to the most appropriate 
distance measure to be used (Sokal 1977; Seber 1984).  Nevertheless, Mimmack et al. (2001) 
advocated that the following properties are fundamental to all measures of distance:  
a) Symmetry: The distance from xr to xs is the same as the distance from xs to xr, that is, 
drs = dsr. 
 
b) Nonnegativity: Distance is measured as a nonnegative quantity, that is, drs  0. 
c) Identification: The distance between xr and xr is zero, that is, drr = 0. 
d) Definiteness. If the distance between xr and xs is zero, then xr and xs are the same,   
that is, drs = 0 only if xr = xs. 
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e) Triangle Inequality. The length of one side of the triangle formed by any three points 
cannot be greater than the total length of the other two sides—that is, drs  drk + dsk. 
 
Properties (d) and (e) are desirable to ensure that the distance measures are metrics (Mielke 
1985, Mardia et al. 1979; Krzanowski 1988).  Distances that are not metrics have the problem 
that one can have a zero distance without the points being coincident, and also that a projection 
of the n points into lower-dimensional space may be problematic (Krzanowski 1988). 
 In addition to distance measures, graphical aids are very useful for verifying, evaluating 
and fine-tuning the results from clustering algorithms.  Such graphical aids include scatter plots, 
principal components, Andrews’ plots, three-dimensional plots, blob plots or bubble plots, 
Chernoff faces and star or sun-ray plots (Johnson 1998). 
2.1.2 Clustering Methods and Algorithms 
Searching for clusters involves two general methods: hierarchical and nonhierarchical 
methods.  Nonhierarchical cluster analysis methods select an initial set of cluster seed points and 
then build clusters around individual seeds by assigning an observed data point to its closest seed 
using dissimilarity measure to measure the distances between data points and the cluster seeds.  
However, nonhierarchical methods may produce misleading results because they rely on an 
initial guess of the seed points and the number of clusters.  In addition, some computing 
packages choose seed points depending on the order in which the data are read into the computer 
and too many seed points and clusters may result.  
Hierarchical methods group observed data points into clusters in a nested sequence of 
clustering.  Single-link clustering methods are the most efficient hierarchical methods.  The 
single-link methods include the nearest neighbor method (where the distance between clusters is 
the distance between their two closest members), the furthest neighbor method (where the 
13 
 
distance between clusters is the distance between their two furthest members), the centroid 
method (via distance between cluster means), the average method (distance between clusters 
determined by the average of all dissimilarities between all pairs of points) and Ward’s minimum 
variance method (distance between two clusters is the square of the distance between cluster 
means divided by the sum of the reciprocals of the number of points within each cluster) 
(Johnson, 1998).  These methods differ from one another in the forms of distance measures they 
use.   
Several statistical procedures and a hierarchical tree diagram (or icicle plot) can be used 
to decide when to stop the clustering process (i.e., when an appropriate number of clusters has 
been determined).  The statistical procedures include Beale’s F-type statistic (which helps to 
determine an appropriate number of clusters), a pseudo Hotelling’s T2 test (which helps to decide 
whether pairs of clusters should be combined), the cubic clustering criterion, or CCC (which 
provides many choices as to the number of clusters) and the principal components analysis.   
The CCC, developed through extensive simulations by Sarle (1983), can be used for 
crude hypothesis testing and estimating the number of population clusters.  It is based on the 
assumption that a uniform distribution on a hyperrectangle will be divided into clusters shaped 
roughly like hypercubes (or squares in a two-dimensional case).  In large samples that can be 
divided into the appropriate number of hypercubes, this assumption gives very accurate results 
(SAS 1999) but only if clustering variables are not highly correlated (Lewis et al., 2006).  In 
other cases the approximation is generally conservative.  Specifically, the CCC is obtained by 
comparing the observed coefficient of determination (R
2
) to the approximate expected R
2
 using 
an approximate variance-stabilizing transformation.  The CCC tests the following hypothesis: 
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H0 = the data have been sampled from a uniform distribution on a hyperbox 
H1 = the data have been sampled from a mixture of spherical multivariate normal 
         distributions, with equal variances and sampling probabilities. 
H0 will be rejected if the CCC values are positive, which means that the value of the observed R
2
 
is greater than would be expected if the sampling was from a uniform distribution and therefore 
indicates the possible presence of clusters (SAS, 1983).     
Examples of a hierarchical tree diagram and a CCC plot (a plot of CCC values against the 
number of clusters) that can be produced from a clustering procedure with nine data points are 
shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.  Using the hypothetical hierarchical tree diagram, one can be 
confident that the nine data points (represented by rectangular blocks on the plot) fall into three 
distinct clusters.  There are two observations in cluster 1.  Cluster 2 contains three observations 
and cluster 3 contains four observations.  Clustering procedures assign clusters to the data points 
using a measure of distance between individual data points.  That is, data points that are very 
close to each other are grouped into the same cluster.  Likewise, if all points (number of clusters) 
on the CCC plot are joined by lines, the small peaks occurring at point number 3 and point 
number 6 indicate that the nine data points are from between three and six distinct clusters.  In 
this example, however, a number of clusters that is greater than 3 may be inappropriate since it 
will result in some clusters having only one observation.  Normally, peaks on a CCC plot that 
has a CCC value that is greater than three (CCC > 3) would correspond to an appropriate number 
of clusters. 
Principal components analysis (PCA) is basically used as a tool for screening multivariate 
data as well as verifying distributional assumptions such as normality of the variables and the 
independence of the experimental units (Johnson, 1998).  The PCA creates a new set of 
uncorrelated variables, called principal component scores, from a set of correlated variables.  The  
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Figure 2.1  A Hierarchical Tree Diagram for Nine Hypothetical Data Points 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2  A Cubic Clustering Criterion Plot for Nine Hypothetical Data Points 
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new variables can be used as inputs for graphing and plotting programs.  When used in clustering 
programs, the principal component scores are plotted in order to screen clusters and associated 
observations.   
Figure 2.3 shows a two-dimensional plot of the principal component scores from a 
clustering program with nine hypothetical data points.  The principal component scores for the 
first variable (PRIN1) are plotted on the horizontal axis, while the scores for the second variable 
(PRIN2) are plotted on the vertical axis.  It appears that there are four clusters in this dataset with 
cluster 1 containing two observations and an equal number of observations (3) contained in 
Cluster 3.  Cluster 4, which contains only one observation, may be misleading.  However, since 
it is closer to cluster 3, it might be appropriate to merge it with cluster three, resulting in a total 
of three clusters. 
A consensus between the icicle plot, the CCC plot and the plot of the principal 
component scores will, therefore, result in three clusters. Further discussion of the various 
clustering methods, common clustering packages and programs, empirical comparisons of the 
performance of clustering algorithms can be found in Punj and Stewart (1983) and Johnson 
(1998). 
 2.2 Review of Literature 
This section provides a synopsis of studies that have applied the concept of cluster 
analysis. While none of these studies focuses specifically on natural resource sectors, the 
phenomenon of clustering that is addressed is applicable to this sector as well.  Three notable 
areas where the use of cluster analysis has been commonly demonstrated are in medical and 
nutrition, marketing as well as economic/financial fields. 
 
17 
 
 
Figure 2.3  A Plot of Principal Component Scores for Nine Hypothetical Data Points 
 
 
   
 In a clinical study, Haldar et al. (2008) explored the application of a k-means cluster 
analysis to identify distinct phenotypic groups in three independent asthma populations in order 
to examine differences in asthma outcomes (exacerbation frequency and change in corticosteroid 
dose at 12 months) within or between the groups.  The first two populations are primary to the 
clinical study and included a population of 184 patients under management in primary care with 
predominantly mild to moderate disease and a refractory asthma population consisting of 187 
patients who were managed in secondary care.  The third population is an offshoot of a separate 
study completed earlier (Haldar et. al., 2006) and consists of 68 patients with predominantly 
refractory asthma clustered at entry into a randomized trial comparing a strategy of minimizing 
eosinophilic inflammation (inflammation guided strategy) with standard care.   
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 The results showed that a 3-cluster model best fits the primary care population dataset, 4-
cluster models best fits the secondary care population and a 3-cluster model best fits the third 
population.  Considering asthma outcomes, two clusters (early onset atopic and obese, non-
eosinophilic) were common to both populations of subjects managed in primary and secondary 
care.  However, two clusters characterized by marked discordance between symptom expression 
and eosinophilic airway inflammation (early onset symptom predominant and late onset 
inflammation predominant) were specific to refractory asthma.  The results also found that 
inflammation guided management was superior for both discordant subgroups leading to a 
reduction in exacerbation frequency in the inflammation predominant cluster and a dose 
reduction of inhaled corticosteroid in the symptom predominant cluster.  The study concluded 
that cluster analysis offers a novel multidimensional approach for identifying asthma phenotypes 
that exhibit differences in clinical response to treatment algorithms. 
 Psoter et al. (2009) conducted cluster analysis on dataset comprise of 5,169 Arizona 
children in the U.S., with an age range of 5-59-months.  The goal was to delineate patterns of 
caries (the criteria defined as a visual break in enamel surface, pit and fissure discoloration with 
adjacent opacity, evidence of marginal ridge undermining, and anterior shadowing on 
transillumination) in the primary dentition of pre-school children without a priori pattern 
definitions.  Authors used all data for children ages 0-4 years in aggregate for all subjects as well 
as for subjects without crowned restored teeth (i.e., ages in aggregate and ages in aggregate 
excluding subjects with crown restorations).  Each of these two sets of analyses consisted of 8 
differently specified cluster analyses as a validation procedure.  These eight different cluster 
analyses involve two hierarchical clustering methods (furthest neighbor and average between 
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group linkages) using four proximity (similarity/dissimilarity) measures (simple matching, 
Hamann, Euclidean squared distance and variance). 
 The clustering analysis identified four caries patterns among the patients: smooth 
surfaces (other than the maxillary incisor), maxillary incisor, occlusal surfaces of first molars as 
well as pit and fissure surfaces of second molars.  The study concluded that the cluster analysis 
findings were consistent with results produced by multidimensional scaling and that the cross-
validated patterns identified may represent resulting disease conditions from different risks or the 
timing of various risk factor exposures. As such, the patterns may be useful case definitions for 
caries risk factor investigations in children under 60 months of age. 
 Risvas et al. (2008) conducted a mailed survey to assess awareness and behavioral 
change for healthy diets (i.e., food consumption, nutrition knowledge and factors associated with 
dietary change) among 2,439 fifth and sixth grade students in Attica and Thessaloniki regions of 
Greece.  The study was done to identify some mediating parameters necessary for planning 
interventions to promote healthy nutrition.  The k-means cluster analysis in conjunction with 
principal components analysis was used to analyze the data.  Three distinct clusters were 
identified for each segment of the study.  For the food consumption segment, they found that the 
students demonstrated unbalanced nutrition, balanced nutrition and low food intake.  The three 
groups identified for nutrition knowledge consist of students who demonstrated a good, medium 
and bad knowledge of nutritional issues.  With regard to dietary habits, students were classified 
based on their responses as to how their environment and perceptions on the health value of 
foods have affected them.  Groups identified include those that demonstrated a negative effect, a 
health oriented group and a group reinforced to eat healthy diets like fruits and vegetables. 
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In a study involving a financial data of stock portfolio, Tola et al. (2008) used correlation 
matrices whose inherent information (or properties) were filtered by the single linkage and 
average linkage clustering procedures (i.e., the correlation coefficient between two time series is 
assumed to be a measure of the similarity between the two time series) in order to examine the 
reliability of the financial portfolio.  The authors compared the findings from the clustering 
algorithms with the results provided by other methods such as random matrix theory (RMT) 
filtering and Markowitz optimization.  The results show that, under idealized and realistic 
conditions, the use of clustering methods to build financial portfolios can provide more reliable 
portfolios (in terms of the error in the forecasted risk) than the ones obtained with RMT filtering 
and with Markowitz optimization. They also noted that for this set of data, the realized risk (a 
measure of the riskiness of the portfolio) obtained with the clustering method is almost always 
smaller than the realized risk of the RMT portfolio.  Additional information on correlation based 
clustering which has been applied to infer the hierarchical structure of a portfolio of stocks from 
its correlation coefficient matrix can be found in Mantegna (1999) and Bonanno et al. (2001, 
2003). 
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Chapter 3 - Data and Analytical Procedures 
Fisheries data from the trip ticket information compiled by the Louisiana Department of 
Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) is used for this study.  The trip ticket forms were developed to 
collect information on commercial fishing trips, fishing gear use, dockside sales of seafood 
harvest and dockside purchases of different seafood such as shrimp, crabs, wild-caught crawfish, 
oysters and freshwater and saltwater finfish.  Specifically, commercial seafood harvest (i.e., 
seafood landings), sales and purchases are the primary information used in this analysis. 
A cluster analysis, which is based on the hierarchical, single-linkage, average method, 
was conducted in SAS (User’s Guide, 2004) to categorize commercial fishermen and 
wholesale/retail seafood dealers into groups (or clusters) using the three-year averages of seafood 
landings and revenues they reported through the trip ticket forms.  The seafood landings 
(measured in pounds) and revenues (measured in dollars) are standardized for transformation 
into comparable units to avoid undue influence of a particular variable on the outcomes of the 
analysis.  The means and standard deviations of seafood landings and the dockside seafood sales 
for individual original tiers of commercial fishermen are shown in Table 3.1.  The table shows 
that the standard deviations for the seafood landings are greater than the standard deviations for 
the dockside seafood sales for all tiers of fishermen.  Using unstandardized data would result in 
seafood landings having more weight in identifying clusters than dockside seafood sales.  Similar 
information is provided in Table 3.2 for the wholesale/retail seafood dealers where the standard 
deviations of the seafood landings are greater than the standard deviations for the dockside 
seafood purchases for all tiers of seafood dealers. 
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Table 3.1  Means and Standard Deviations of Seafood Landings and Dockside Sales by the 
Commercial Fishermen 
 Seafood Landings Dockside Seafood Sales 
Original Tier Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. Mean ($) Std. Dev. 
Tier 1 18,030 12,480 13,690 5,335 
Tier 2 70,274 46,315 57,191 23,521 
Tier 3 828,131 6,119,054 325,979 368,068 
 
 
Table 3.2  Means and Standard Deviations of Seafood Purchases and Dockside Purchases 
by the Wholesale / Retailer Dealers 
 Seafood Landings Dockside Seafood Purchases 
Original Tier Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. Mean ($) Std. Dev. 
Tier 1 45,156 54,360 42,102 14,253 
Tier 2 313,672 343,958 248,831 151,131 
Tier 3 19,307,258 107,390,855 5,164,129 7,775,519 
 
 
The correlation coefficients between commercial fishermen’s seafood landings and 
dockside values (revenues) of seafood sales and the correlation coefficients between commercial 
wholesale/retail dealers’ seafood purchases and dockside values (revenues) of seafood purchases 
are presented in Table 3.3.  The table shows a positive linear relationship between the two 
variables for individual fisheries participants.  Except for the tier 1 of both commercial fishermen 
and wholesale/retail seafood dealers, the correlation coefficients are approximately 0.60 or 
greater.  In a study like this where the researchers have little or no control over the population 
from which the data were collected, these numbers would be considered large enough to be of 
practical importance but not too high to distort the results of the clustering procedures, especially 
regarding the correctness of the values of the cubic clustering criterion discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Table 3.3  Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Seafood Landings, Sales and 
Purchases 
Commercial Fishery Participants Sample Size Correlation Coefficients 
Fishermen (Landings vs. Sales)   
      Tier 1 1,265 0.5471 
      Tier 2 1,580 0.5914 
      Tier 3 1,577 0.6940 
      Total 4,422 0.6370 
Seafood Dealers (Landings vs. Purchases)   
      Tier 1 113 0.3645 
      Tier 2 141 0.6188 
      Tier 3 141 0.6617 
      Total 395 0.6467 
Note: Values were missing on seafood landings and dockside seafood sales for a fisherman in tier 2 and four fishermen in tier 3.  The missing 
data were removed prior to computing summary statistics. 
 
 
As shown in the previous sections, the variability within each of the seafood landings and 
values of seafood sales for the commercial fishermen as well as the variability within each of 
seafood purchases and the values of purchases for the seafood dealers are moderately large.  To 
facilitate an easy visualization of the relationships among these variables, logarithmic 
transformations are performed on the data.  The scatter plot of the log transformations of the 
seafood landings and dockside values of seafood sales for the entire population of commercial 
fishermen is shown in Figure 3.1.  Also the scatter plot of the log transformations of the seafood 
purchases and dockside values of seafood purchases for the entire commercial wholesale/retail 
seafood dealers is shown in Figure 3.2.  Similarly, the scatter plots of the fishermen specific 
variables by tier and seafood dealers’ specific variables by tier are shown in Appendix Figures 
A.1 to A.6.  The information in these scatter plots is consistent with the information provided in 
Table 3.3.   
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Figure 3.1  Scatter Plot of Seafood Landings and Dockside Sales for Commercial 
Fishermen 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Scatter Plot of Seafood Purchases and Dockside Values for Wholesale/Retail 
Seafood Dealers 
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The results from the cluster programs are verified, evaluated and fine-tuned using 
graphical aids including icicle plots (hierarchical tree diagram), plots of cubic clustering criterion 
as well as two-dimensional plots of principal component scores to decide when to stop the 
clustering process.  Average revenues from fishermen’s seafood sales and dealers’ seafood 
purchases are calculated and compared among clusters and thereafter used to determine an 
alternative compensation plan for each of the two participant groups.  The amount of 
compensation received by individual fishermen and seafood dealers in their original tiers are 
then compared to the amount of compensation suggested by individual clusters in order to 
examine if existing administrative processes have ensured a more equitable distribution of 
disaster payment funds to seafood participants. 
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Chapter 4 - Results and Discussion 
The Z scores derived via standardization of the original seafood landings and dockside 
sales for commercial fishermen and wholesale/retail dealers’ seafood purchases (in quantities 
and values) were analyzed by cluster procedures using the hierarchical, single-linkage, average 
method.  A consensus numbers of clusters were determined among seafood fishermen and 
dealers using a combination of the icicle plot, pseudo Hotteling’s T2 test, the cubic clustering 
criterion (CCC) and two-dimensional plot of principal components scores.  The CCC values are 
negative for both fishermen and dealers, satisfying Sale’s (1983) crude hypothesis for possible 
presence of clusters.  The results are presented in three parts, which consist of results for the 
fishermen, results for the seafood dealers, followed by comparisons of initial compensation plans 
and newly suggested compensation plans for allocating hurricanes assistance funds to both 
groups. 
 4.1 Results of Cluster Analysis on the Commercial Fishermen 
The pseudo Hotteling’s T2 test resultsa and a plot of the cubic clustering criterion 
(Appendix Figure B.1) were used to determine the initial number of clusters (between 4 and 14 
clusters) for the commercial fishermen who were eligible to participate in the cooperative 
research program.  To derive the appropriate number of clusters, a hierarchical tree diagram 
(Appendix Figure B.2) and a two-dimensional plot of the principal component scores (Appendix 
Figure B.3) were employed to verify and fine-tune the initial results.  This effort leads to a 
combination of clusters that are very close to each other.  To ensure legally required 
                                                 
a
 The table containing these results is very large and therefore not included in this report.  This table may be 
requested from the author. 
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confidentiality of information on fisheries participants in Louisiana, any cluster or entry 
containing information for fewer than four participants is merged with its nearest neighbor.    
Clusters in Appendix Figure B.3 were labeled 1 to 14 with the clustering program 
showing only the first digits for clusters numbers above 9 (i.e., 10 to 14).  Thus, Cluster 10 
represents the digits of 1s beside Cluster 9 and Cluster 13 is the single number 1 at the top right 
corner of Cluster 10.  Both Clusters (10 and 13) were merged with Cluster 1 below them.  
Cluster 11 (above Cluster 2) is merged with Cluster 5, while Cluster 12 (at the right side of 
Cluster 6) was merged with Cluster 6.  Cluster 14, containing a single observation, was also 
merged with Cluster 8.  This exercise eventually resulted in seven (7) clusters among the 
commercial fishermen.  Listing them by the magnitude of their average seafood sales therefore, 
Cluster A combines the previous Clusters 5 and 11, Cluster B consists of Clusters 2 and 7, 
Cluster C merges Clusters 4 and 9, Cluster D replaces Cluster 3, and Cluster E combines Clusters 
1, 10 and 13.  Initial Clusters 6 and 12 were combined to form Cluster F, while Clusters 8 and 14 
form Cluster G.      
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the commercial fishermen into the seven (7) clusters, 
namely Clusters A through G, and the regroup of fishermen from the original three tiers.  On the 
redistribution of the fishermen in the original tiers, the table shows that from the original tier 1, 
five hundred and sixteen (517), six hundred and ninety four (694) and fifty five (55) fishermen 
are redistributed into Clusters A, B and C, respectively.  Cluster B received additional two 
hundred and seventy five (275) fishermen from tier 2, which also supplied the greater number of 
individuals (765) to cluster C.  Five hundred and thirty three (533) fishermen from tier 2 and 
three hundred and ninety four (394) fishermen from tier 3 reconstitute Cluster D, while Cluster E 
consists of seven (7) tier 2 and nine hundred and ninety two (992) tier 3 fishermen.  Clusters F 
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Table 4.1  Number of Commercial Fishermen by Tier and Cluster 
 
Cluster 
Number of Fisherman by Tier Total Number of 
Fishermen by Cluster Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
A 517 - - 517 
B 694 275 - 969 
C 55 765 - 820 
D - 533 394 927 
E - 7 992 999 
F - - 180 180 
G - - 15 15 
Total Number of 
Fishermen by Group 
1,265 1,581 1,581 4,427 
Note: The total number of fishermen by tier may not add up correctly due to merging of cells for confidentiality purposes. 
 
 
and G are comprised of 180 fishermen and 15 fishermen, respectively, from the tier 3.  Thus, 
three new groups would be contained in the original tier 1 and at least four new groups would be 
contained in the original tier 2.  Tier 3 would contain four different new groups. 
The summary statistics on the seafood landings and dockside seafood sales for Clusters A 
to G of commercial fishermen are presented in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively.  The 
standard deviations of seafood landings (Table 4.2) might be misleading since they might contain 
landings from different seafood types, resulting to adding pounds of shrimp to pounds of finfish.  
This combination might have led to the large variations within and between clusters and tiers.   
The standard deviations for dockside seafood sales within individual clusters and tiers (Table 
4.3) are smaller when compared to the total standard deviations for the original tiers except for 
that corresponding to Cluster G, which is caused by tier 3.  For example, the standard deviation  
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Table 4.2  Summary Statistics of Seafood Landings by Tiers and Clusters of the Commercial Fishermen 
Cluster 
Tier1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Total By Cluster 
Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. 
A 9,793 5,054 - - - - 9,778 5,060 
B 21,268 7,577 25,248 9,218 - - 22,398 8,269 
C 54,442 23,058 57,367 26,341 - - 57,170 26,131 
D - - 107,964 32,359 115,583 43,689 111,202 37,760 
E - - 388,309 142,551 247,249 166,225 248,238 166,426 
F - - - - 686,231 1,701,368 686,231 1,701,368 
G - - - - 59,496,838 21,207,325 59,496,838 21,207,325 
Group Total 18,030 12,480 70,268 46,301 826,556 6,111,383 325,432 3,670,651 
Note: The seafood landings for group total by tier may not correspond to those in Table 3.1 due to merging of cells for confidentiality purposes. 
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Table 4.3  Summary Statistics of Seafood Dockside Sales by Tiers and Clusters of the Commercial Fishermen 
Cluster 
Tier1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Total By Cluster 
Mean ($) Std. Dev. Mean ($) Std. Dev. Mean ($) Std. Dev. Mean ($) Std. Dev. 
A 8,739 2,085 - - - - 8,781 2,296 
B 16,841 3,995 32,155 6,001 - - 21,187 8,327 
C 20,364 3,576 48,199 14,047 - - 46,332 15,279 
D - - 82,546 15,279 136,393 26,640 105,432 33,833 
E - - 96,032 10,155 267,216 109,619 266,017 110,167 
F - - - - 842,205 274,723 842,205 274,723 
G - - - - 2,967,428 1,122,721 2,967,428 1,122,721 
Group Total 13,689 5,335 57,188 23,513 325,696 367,645 140,650 260,352 
Note: The seafood sales for group total by tier may not correspond to those in Table 3.1 due to merging of cells for confidentiality purposes. 
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for dockside seafood sales for fishermen in original tier 1 (row total) is 5,335.  This statistic is 
greater than the largest standard deviation (3,995) corresponding to Cluster B within the same 
tier 1.  When the standard deviation of a series within a cluster is larger than the standard 
deviation of the series from the original tier in which the cluster lies, the culprits are likely to be 
connected to the smaller number of observations in the cluster or the merging of two or more 
clusters to form that particular cluster.  That, perhaps, is the case for the cell corresponding to the 
intersection of Cluster G and tier 3. 
 4.2 Results of Cluster Analysis on the Commercial Wholesale/Retail Seafood 
Dealers 
 
Similar to section 4.1, which reports the results for the commercial fishermen, the pseudo 
Hotteling’s T2 test resultsb and a plot of the cubic clustering criterion (Appendix Figure C.1) 
were used to determine the initial number of clusters (between 3 and 8 clusters) for the 
wholesale/retail seafood dealers who were eligible to participate in the cooperative research 
program.  To derive the appropriate number of clusters, a hierarchical tree diagram (Appendix 
Figure C.2) and a two-dimensional plot of the principal component scores (Appendix Figure C.3) 
were employed to verify and fine-tune the initial results.  Merging of clusters is done only to 
satisfy Louisiana’s confidentiality obligations requiring non-reporting of participants information 
when their number is less than 4.   
Figure C.3 labels clusters from 1 to 8.  Listing these clusters by the magnitude of their 
average seafood purchases, Cluster A replaces previous Cluster 1, Cluster B combines previous 
                                                 
b
 The table containing these results is very large and therefore not included in this report.  This table could be 
requested from the author. 
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Clusters 6 and 8, Cluster C, D and E replace Cluster 2, 3 and 4, respectively, and cluster F 
combines Clusters 5 and 7. 
Table 4.4 shows the classification of the three hundred and ninety five (395) seafood 
wholesale/retail dealers, which initially were tiered into three groups, into six new clusters 
(Clusters A to F).  Any cluster or entry violating the State’s confidentiality law is merged with 
the closest neighbor.  Thus, Cluster A is made up of ninety five (95) dealers from original tier 1 
and twenty five (25) dealers from original tier 2.  Cluster B contains sixteen (16) dealers from 
tier 1 and four (4) dealers from tier 2, while all ninety four (94) dealers in Cluster C are from tier 
2.  Cluster D is made up of twenty (20) dealers from tier 2 and twenty nine (29) dealers from tier 
3.  The rest of the dealers in tier 3 are split between Clusters E (74 dealers) and Cluster F (38 
dealers).  Thus, there would be two new clusters in original tier 1, four new clusters in original 
tier 2, and three new clusters in the original tier 3.         
The summary statistics for individual clusters with the original tiers used by the 
Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) to allocate disaster funds to individual 
qualifying wholesale/retail seafood dealers are presented in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6.  As 
previously stated, the summary statistics for the seafood landings sales or purchases (Table 4.5) 
might be misleading since it allows addition of pounds of different seafood such as shrimp and 
finfish.  Hence, this section focuses on the summary statistics from dollar of seafood purchases.  
Table 4.6 shows that the standard deviations within individual clusters for the dockside 
seafood purchases are smaller when compared to the standard deviations for the original tiers 
(total by tier) except for the cell corresponding to cluster F and tier 3 or the total standard 
deviation for cluster F.  For example, the standard deviation for dockside seafood purchases by 
wholesale/retail seafood dealers in the original tier 1 is 14,253.  The cluster with the largest  
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Table 4.4  Number of Commercial Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers by Tier and Cluster 
Cluster 
Number of Dealers By Tier 
Total Number of 
Dealers By Cluster TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3 
A 95 25 - 120 
B 16 4 - 20 
C - 94 - 94 
D - 20 29 49 
E - - 74 74 
F - - 38 38 
Total Number of 
Dealers by Group 113 141 141 395 
Note: The total number of dealers by tier may not add up correctly due to merging of cells for confidentiality purposes. 
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Table 4.5  Summary Statistics of Seafood Landings Purchased by Tier and Cluster of the Commercial Wholesale/Retail 
Dealers 
Cluster 
Tier1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Total By Cluster 
Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. Mean (Lbs.) Std. Dev. 
A 44,274 27,100 56,424 20,497 - - 46,805 26,256 
B 7,946 2,428 14,103 5,539 - - 9,177 3,985 
C - - 251,576 150,453 - - 254,409 150,397 
D - - 980,789 411,918 907,743 369,375 937,558 384,796 
E - - - - 2,851,559 2,031,559 2,851,559 2,031,559 
F - - - - 65,394,302 201,596,165 65,394,302 201,596,165 
Group Total 45,156 54,360 313,672 343,958 19,307,258 107,390,855 7,016,845 64,668,909 
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Table 4.6  Summary Statistics of Seafood Dockside Purchases by Tier and Cluster of the Commercial Wholesale/Retail Dealers 
Cluster 
Tier1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Total By Cluster 
Mean ($) Std. Dev. Mean ($) Std. Dev. Mean ($) Std. Dev. Mean ($) Std. Dev. 
A 42,794 14,204 89,194 16,289 - - 52,461 23,894 
B 36,379 13,522 167,866 106,903 - - 62,676 69,718 
C - - 247,881 121,080 - - 243,777 123,002 
D - - 468,945 100,138 975,673 303,094 768,845 347,675 
E - - - - 2,386,930 933,395 2,386,930 933,395 
F - - - - 13,768,810 11,034,350 13,768,810 11,034,350 
Group Total 42,102 14,253 248,831 151,131 5,164,129 7,775,519 1,944,266 5,221,836 
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standard deviation for seafood purchases within tier 1 is Cluster A having a standard deviation of 
14,204, which is smaller than the total for that same tier.   This phenomenon, coupled with a 
large standard deviation for Cluster F, is likely to be connected to the smaller numbers of 
observations or the merging of clusters. 
 4.3 Evaluation of Compensation Plans 
 The minimum values of seafood sales by commercial fishermen and seafood purchases 
by wholesale/retail seafood dealers were used by the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and 
Fisheries (LDWF) to compute the amount of compensation paid to the individual participants in 
the Cooperative Research Program.  This method appears to be inconsistent with the average 
method (a measure of central tendency), which is common in the literature.  In addition, the two-
variable clustering methods (adopted for this analysis), in contrast to the one-variable percentile 
methods (used by LDWF), might have resulted in the clusters of individuals having overlapped 
minimum values.  As a result of these observations, the average values of seafood sales and 
purchases within individual clusters are used to compute the compensation for individual clusters 
and participants.  Table 4.7 shows how the computations of these average measures were done 
for individual clusters of commercial fishermen.  Similar computations were performed for all 
clusters of the wholesale/retail seafood dealers (Table 4.8).  
In order to examine whether the original compensation plans (developed using the 
percentile methods) were effective in ensuring a fair and equitable distribution of hurricanes 
assistance funds, the original compensation plan for commercial fishermen consisting of 
approximately $7,679,486, the original compensation plan for  wholesale/retail seafood dealers 
consisting of an earmark of $7 million, and the average values of seafood sales and purchases are 
used to develop an alternative compensation plan for commercial fishermen and an 
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Table 4.7  Allocation of Disaster Funds among Commercial Fishermen by Cluster 
 
Cluster 
Average 
Sales Level 
(A) 
Number of 
Fisherman 
(B) 
Average 
Total Sales 
(C) = (A) x (B) 
Cluster Share of 
Allocation 
(D) = (Ci/Ct) x SF 
Individual 
Share of 
Allocation 
E = (D / B) 
A $8,781  517 $4,539,777 $55,991 $108.30 
B $21,187  969 $20,530,203 $253,207 $261.31 
C $46,332  820 $37,992,240 $468,574 $571.43 
D $105,432  927 $97,735,464 $1,205,412 $1,300.34 
E $266,017  999 $265,750,983 $3,277,617 $3,280.90 
F $842,205  180 $151,596,900 $1,869,707 $10,387.26 
G $2,967,428  15 $44,511,420 $548,978 $36,598.52 
Total $4,257,382 4,427 $622,656,987 $7,679,486 - 
Note: Ci represents computed shares of allocation for each cluster while Ct is the sum of all Ci in column (C).  SF= $7,679,486 
(total of disaster funds allocated to commercial fishermen). 
 
 
 
Table 4.8  Allocation of Disaster Funds among Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers by 
Cluster 
 
Cluster 
Average 
Purchases Level 
(A) 
Number of 
Dealers 
(B) 
Average Total 
Purchases 
(C) = (A) x (B) 
Cluster Share 
(D) = (Ci/Ct) SD 
Individual 
Share of 
Allocation 
E = (D / B) 
A $52,461  120 $6,295,320 $57,380 $478.17 
B $62,676  20 $1,253,520 $11,426 $571.28 
C $243,777  94 $22,915,038 $208,865 $2,221.97 
D $768,845  49 $37,673,405 $343,384 $7,007.84 
E $2,386,930  74 $176,632,820 $1,609,966 $21,756.30 
F $13,768,810  38 $523,214,780 $4,768,979 $125,499.44 
Total $17,283,499  395 $767,984,883 $7,000,000 - 
Note: Ci represents computed shares of allocation for each cluster while Ct is the sum of all Ci in column (C).  SD = $7,000,000 
(total of disaster funds allocated to seafood dealers). 
 
 
 
38 
 
alternative compensation plan for the seafood dealers. 
 The alternative compensation plan for the commercial fishermen, which is based on their 
average seafood sales per cluster, is shown by Table 4.9 (See Appendix Table B.1 for a 
comparable compensation plan, which is based on the minimum seafood sales).  The table shows 
that the new compensation structure for the commercial fishermen would consist of $108.30 for 
Cluster A, $261.31 for Cluster B, $571.43 for Cluster C, and $1,300.34 for Cluster D.  
Individuals in Clusters E, F, and G would receive $3,280.90, $10,387.26, and 
$36,598.52,respectively.  The remaining part of this section compares this new payment structure 
with the original compensation plan (See Table 1.1) consisting of $208.83 for tier 1, $870.22 for 
tier 2 and $3,820.05 for tier 3 to examine whether there has been over-compensation or under-
compensation of commercial fishermen who participated in the cooperative research survey. 
Using the new compensation structure, five hundred and seventeen (517) commercial 
fishermen who were reclassified from tier 1 to Cluster A would have been paid $100.53 less for 
their participation in the cooperative research program.  In Cluster B, six hundred and ninety four 
(694) fishermen from tier 1 would be paid an additional $52.48, while two hundred and seventy 
five (275) fishermen from tier 2 would be paid $608.91 less when compared to the original 
amounts ($208.83 and $870.22, respectively) which they actually received.  Fifty five (55) 
individuals from original tier 1, who now fall in Cluster C, would receive an additional $362.60 
compared to $208.82 they actually received, while seven hundred and sixty five (765) from tier 
2, who fall in cluster C, would be paid $298.79 less compared to $870.22 actually paid to them.  
Cluster D contains five hundred and thirty three (533) individuals from tier 2 and three hundred 
and ninety four (394) individuals from tier 3, who would receive $2,519.71 less and $430.12 
more, respectively, of what they actually received.  In Cluster E, seven (7) fishermen would be  
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Table 4.9  Average-Sales-Based Alternative Compensation Plan for Commercial Fishermen Who Participated in the 
Cooperative Research Program 
Cluster and Recommended (New) 
Payment Amount 
Number of Fisherman by Original Tier and 
Payment Amount 
Number of 
Fishermen by 
Cluster 
Amount of 
Payment per 
Cluster Cluster New Pay 
New Pay - 
Original Pay 
Tier 1               
($208.83) 
Tier 2        
($870.22) 
Tier 3     
($3,820.05) 
A $108.30 - $100.53  517 - - 517 $55,991 
B $261.31 
- $608.91 . 275 - 
969 $253,209 
$52.48 694 - - 
C $571.43 
- $298.79 - 765 - 
820 $468,573 
$362.60 55 - - 
D $1,300.34 
- $2,519.71 - - 394 
927 $1,205,415 
$430.12 - 533 - 
E $3,280.90 
- $539.15 - - 992 
999 $3,277,619 
$2,410.68 - 7 - 
F $10,387.26 $6,567.21 - - 180 180 $1,869,707 
G $36,598.52 $32.778.47 - - 15 15 $548,978 
Total 1,265 1,581 1,581 4,427 $7,679,492 
Note: The total number of fishermen by tier may not add up correctly due to merging of cells for confidentiality purposes.  See Appendix Table B.1 for the 
minimum-sales-based alternative compensation plan for the same fishermen. 
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paid an additional $2,410.68 and nine hundred and ninety two (992) will receive $539.15 less 
than they were paid.  The results are more interesting for Clusters F and G, which are made up of 
a smaller portion of the original tier 3.  Specifically, the new compensation plan would pay 
$6,567.21 more to a hundred and eighty (180) fishermen, who are now in Cluster F and 
$32,778.47 more to the top fifteen (15) commercial fishermen who are in Cluster G and had a 
total average seafood sales of approximately $3 million (7.1% of total sales).  The original 
payment received by individual commercial fishermen in tier 3 was $3,820.05. 
Table 4.10 presents an alternative compensation plan for the wholesale/retail seafood 
dealers based on the average seafood purchases by cluster (See Appendix Table C.1 for a 
comparable compensation plan, which is based on the minimum seafood purchases).  The 
original compensation structure paid $1,437.91, $4,678.05 and $43,814.97 to dealers in tier 1, 
tier 2 and tier 3, respectively, while the new compensation structure suggests payment plan 
including $478.17 (Cluster A), $571.28 (Cluster B), $2,221.97 (Cluster C), $7,007.84 (Cluster 
D), $21,756.30 (Cluster E) and $125,499.44 (Cluster F).  The remaining part of this section 
compares this new payment structure with the original compensation plan (See Table 1.3) 
consisting of $1,437.91 for tier 1, $4,678.05 for tier 2 and $43,814.97 for tier 3 to examine 
whether there has been over-compensation or under-compensation of seafood dealers who have 
participated in the cooperative research survey. 
Of the one hundred and twenty (120) seafood dealers who are in Cluster A, ninety five 
(95) come from the original tier 1 and twenty five (25) come from tier 2.  Both groups would 
receive $4,199.88 and $959.74 less, respectively, in the new compensation plan than they 
actually received from the cooperative research program’s original payment plan.  The majority 
(16) of the twenty (20) individuals in Cluster B would receive $866.63 less, while the remaining
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Table 4.10  Average-Purchases-Based Alternative Compensation Plan for Wholesale / Retail Seafood Dealers Who 
Participated in the Cooperative Research Program 
Cluster and Recommended (New) 
Payment Amount 
Number of Dealers by Original Tier and Payment 
Amount 
Number of 
Dealers by 
Cluster 
Amount of 
Payment per 
Cluster Cluster New Pay 
New Pay - 
Original Pay 
Tier 1               
($1,437.91) 
Tier 2        
($4,678.05) 
Tier 3     
($43,814.97) 
A $478.17 
- $4,199.88 - 25 - 
120 $57,380 
- $959.74 95 - - 
B $571.28 
- $4,106.77 - 4 - 
20 $11,426 
- $866.63 16 - - 
C $2,221.97 - $2,456.08 - 94 - 94 $208,865 
D $7,007.84 
- $36,807.13 - - 29 
49 $343,384 
$2,329.79 - 20 - 
E $21,756.30 - $22,058.67 - - 74 74 $1,609,966 
F $125,499.44 $81,684.47 - - 38 38 $4,768,979 
Total 113 141 141 395 $7,000,000 
Note: The total number of dealers by tier may not add up correctly due to merging of cells for confidentiality purposes.  See Appendix Table C.1 for the 
minimum-purchases-based alternative compensation plan for the same dealers. 
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four (4) would receive $4,106.77 less than what were given to them.  All ninety four (94) dealers 
in Cluster C would receive $2,456.08 less.  Most (29) of the twenty nine (49) dealers in Cluster 
D would be paid $36,807.13 less while the remaining twenty (20) will be paid $2,329.79 more.  
Clusters E (with 74 dealers) and F (with 38 dealers) contains the majority (112) of dealers who 
were initially grouped into tier 3.  They would receive $22,058.67 less and $81,684.47 more, 
respectively, than they have received. 
The comparisons between the tier-based and cluster-based contributions of commercial 
fishermen to the total values of seafood sold at Louisiana docks as well as their associated 
allocations of hurricanes assistance funds are presented in Table 4.11 and Table 4.12, 
respectively.  Specifically, Table 4.11 shows disproportional allocations of assistance funds 
when compared with the fishermen’s contribution to values of seafood sales.  For example, the 
contributions to seafood sales were approximately 2.8 percent, 14.5 percent, and 82.7 percent for 
fishermen who were in tier 1, tier 2, and tier 3, respectively.  With approximately 3.4 percent of 
allocated disaster funds, tier 1 fishermen were compensated more than their contributions to total 
seafood sales.  Tier 2 fishermen, with 17.9 percent, were also overcompensated.  The amounts 
with which these fishermen were overcompensated were deduction from allocations for tier 3 
fishermen who received 78.6 percent.  Table 4.12, however, shows that the proportions of 
disaster funds allocated to fishermen in individual clusters are the same with the proportions of 
their contributions to the total values of seafood sales. 
Likewise, the comparisons between the tier-based and cluster-based contributions of 
wholesale/retail seafood dealers to the total values of seafood purchased at Louisiana docks as 
well as their associated allocations of hurricanes assistance funds are presented in Table 4.13 and 
Table 4.14, respectively.  In Table 4.13, seafood dealers in tier 1 received 2.3 percent of  
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Table 4.11  Contribution of Commercial Fishermen to Total Values of Seafood Sold at 
Louisiana Docks and Allocated Disaster Funds by the Original Tier 
Tier 
Values of 
Seafood Sold 
Percent of Total 
Values of Sales 
Disaster Funds 
Allocated 
Percent of Total 
Funds Allocated 
1 $17,317,171 2.78% $264,171 3.44% 
2 $90,414,544 14.52% $1,375,822 17.92% 
3 $514,925,838 82.70% $6,039,493 78.64% 
Total $622,657,553 100.00% $7,679,486 100.00% 
 
 
 
Table 4.12  Contribution of Commercial Fishermen to Total Values of Seafood Sold at 
Louisiana Docks and Allocated Disaster Funds by the Original Cluster 
Cluster 
Values of Seafood 
Sold 
Percent of Total 
Values of Sales 
Disaster Funds 
Allocated 
Percent of Total 
Funds Allocated 
A $4,539,943  0.73% $55,991  0.73% 
B $20,530,561  3.30% $253,207  3.30% 
C $37,992,229  6.10% $468,574  6.10% 
D $97,735,690  15.70% $1,205,412  15.70% 
E $265,750,814  42.68% $3,277,617  42.68% 
F $151,596,890  24.35% $1,869,707  24.35% 
G $44,511,426  7.15% $548,978  7.15% 
Total $622,657,553  100.00% $7,679,486  100.00% 
 
 
 
Table 4.13  Contribution of Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers to Total Values of Seafood 
Purchased at Louisiana Docks and Allocated Disaster Funds by the Original Tier 
Tier 
Values of Seafood 
Purchased 
Percent of Total 
Values of Purchases 
Disaster Funds 
Allocated 
Percent of Total 
Funds Allocated 
1 $4,757,514  0.62% $162,484  2.32% 
2 $35,085,240  4.57% $659,605  9.42% 
3 $728,142,119  94.81% $6,177,911  88.26% 
Total $767,984,873  100.00% $7,000,000  100.00% 
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Table 4.14  Contribution of Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers to Total Values of Seafood 
Purchased at Louisiana Docks and Allocated Disaster Funds by the Original Cluster 
Cluster 
Values of Seafood 
Purchased 
Percent of Total 
Values of Purchases 
Disaster Funds 
Allocated 
Percent of Total 
Funds Allocated 
A $6,295,274  0.82% $57,380  0.82% 
B $1,253,528  0.16% $11,426  0.16% 
C $22,915,054  2.98% $208,865  2.98% 
D $37,673,416  4.91% $343,384  4.91% 
E $176,632,818  23.00% $1,609,966  23.00% 
F $523,214,783  68.13% $4,768,979  68.13% 
Total $767,984,873  100.00% $7,000,000  100.00% 
 
 
 
allocated disaster funds where as they contributed only approximately 0.6 percent of total 
seafood purchases.  The seafood dealers in tier 2 also received 9.4 percent of disaster funds in 
spite of a lower contribution (4.6%) from them to the total seafood purchases.  Tier 3 seafood 
dealers were, however, compensated (with 88.3% of disaster funds) less than their contributions 
(94.8%) to total seafood purchases.  Similar to the commercial fishermen, Table 4.14 shows that 
the proportions of disaster funds allocated to wholesale/retail seafood dealers in individual 
clusters are the same with the proportions of their contributions to the total values of seafood 
purchases.            
With the findings presented so far, this study has been able to establish that efficient 
management of variability within individual groups of observations as well as the use of an 
analytical procedure (clustering methods), which allows more than one measured variable are 
key to making proper classifications and robust analysis.  Specifically, the inclusion of the 
seafood landings variable in the analysis, especially for the commercial fishermen, is important 
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for certain reasons.  First, the seafood landings could represent a composite measure that proxies 
the measures of fishing efforts (in terms of fishing experience, types and sizes of fishing boats 
and fishing gear, number and length of fishing trips, etc.) and production (harvest) risks for the 
commercial fishermen and for the dealers.  This contrasts well with the use of only one variable 
(seafood sales or purchases), which is greatly influenced by price differences among seafood 
types.  A small price difference can favor the participants in one fishery (e.g., oysters) more than 
the participants in other fisheries.  Second, landings inclusion might mitigate the concern that 
lumping of different seafood types into one analysis might generate, thereby minimizing its 
effects on the results and inferences made from them.   
In addition, the use of measure of central tendency (i.e., the averages) is considered to be 
more appropriate standard as it resulted in compensation plans with direct payments, which are 
proportional to the contributions of program participants to the total seafood sales and purchases 
in Louisiana.   The analytical method presented in this study would therefore provide more 
rational classifications of commercial fishermen and wholesale/retail seafood dealers as well as 
ensure an equitable distribution of assistance funds based on the inherent variability of seafood 
sales and purchases of eligible participants. 
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Chapter 5 - Summary and Conclusion 
The focus of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the methods used for 
allocating disaster funds as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita of 2005 and to examine 
alternative methods to aid in determining an efficient criterion for allocating public funds 
earmarked for fisheries assistance program.  The trip ticket data managed by the Louisiana 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries were used and were analyzed using a cluster analysis. 
The number of clusters was determined using a pseudo Hotelling’s T2 test, the cubic 
clustering criterion (CCC) and a tree diagram.  The results of the clustering procedures were 
fine-tuned by computing principal components scores and plotting the scores on a two-
dimensional graph.  In addition, the average dockside seafood sales and purchases were used to 
develop alternative compensation plans for commercial fishermen and wholesale/retail seafood 
dealers who participated in the cooperative research survey. 
Results show that commercial fishermen and the wholesale/retail seafood dealers can be 
classified into more groups based on their seafood harvest, dockside seafood sales and dockside 
seafood purchases than used in the original compensation plans and under the alternative 
grouping relative to the original tiers, some commercial fishermen and dealers might have been 
overcompensated while others might have been undercompensated for participating in the 
research survey. 
Future analysis could be done to improve the findings presented in this paper.  It is 
possible to partition commercial fishermen on one hand and seafood dealers on the other hand 
into individual fishery sectors they participated in (e.g., shrimp, crabs, oysters, wild crawfish, 
and finfish) before conducting a cluster analysis on the individual sectors.  Availability of more 
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variables than the two variables used (seafood landings, sales or purchases) in this study might 
also help to fine-tune the results of the analysis.   
Conducting pair-wise comparison tests of the means of seafood landings and values of 
dockside seafood sales and purchases between individual clusters could be attempted in 
conjunction with the pseudo Hotelling’s T2 test that was considered to select the number of 
clusters in the study. 
Finally, one important aspect of successfully implementing an assistance program, which 
allocates payments to individuals is widespread support from the eligible participants.  This 
requires that the distribution plan be straight forward and easily explainable to an audience not 
well versed in statistical theory nor anything other than the simplest of mathematical formulas.  
Nevertheless, the alternative plan using cluster analysis was a good evaluation of the robustness 
of the percentile based plan which was successfully implemented. 
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Appendix A - Scatter Plots of Seafood Landings and Transactions 
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Figure A.1  Scatter Plot of Seafood Landings and Dockside Sales for Commercial 
Fishermen (Tier 1) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2  Scatter Plot of Seafood Landings and Dockside Sales for Commercial 
Fishermen (Tier 2) 
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Figure A.3  Scatter Plot of Seafood Landings and Dockside Sales for Commercial 
Fishermen (Tier 3) 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.4  Scatter Plot of Seafood Purchases and Dockside Values for Wholesale/Retail 
Seafood Dealers (Tier 1) 
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Figure A.5  Scatter Plot of Seafood Purchases and Dockside Values for Wholesale/Retail 
Seafood Dealers (Tier 2) 
 
 
 
Figure A.6  Scatter Plot of Seafood Purchases and Dockside Values for Wholesale/Retail 
Seafood Dealers (Tier 3) 
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Appendix B - Verification Plots and Other Payment Plan for 
Commercial Fishermen 
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Figure B.1  Plot of the Cubic Clustering Criterion for the Commercial Fishermen 
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Figure B.2  Hierarchical Tree Diagram for the Commercial Fishermen 
 
Note: Vendor_ID represents fishermen’s identification numbers.  The area below the tree diagram blacks out because it contains a very large number (4,427) of Vendor_ID.   
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Figure B.3  Plot of Principal Component Scores for the Commercial Fishermen 
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Table B.1  Minimum-Sales-Based Alternative Compensation Plan for Commercial Fishermen Who Participated in the 
Cooperative Research Program 
Cluster and Recommended (New) 
Payment Amount 
Number of Fisherman by Original Tier and 
Payment Amount 
Number of 
Fishermen by 
Cluster 
Amount of 
Payment per 
Cluster Cluster New Pay 
New Pay - 
Original Pay 
Tier 1               
($208.83) 
Tier 2        
($870.22) 
Tier 3     
($3,820.05) 
A $183.07 $-25.76 517 - - 517 $94,647  
B 
$219.11 
$-651.11 . 275 - 
969 $212,318  
$10.28 694 - - 
C 
$331.67 
$-538.55 - 765 - 
820 $271,969  
$122.84 55 - - 
D 
$1,486.83 
-2,333.22 - - 394 
927 $1,378,291  
$616.61 - 533 - 
E 
$2,619.28 
-1,200.77 - - 992 
999 $2,616,661  
$1,749.06 - 7 - 
F $13,311.03 $9,490.98 - - 180 180 $2,395,985 
G $47,307.35 43,487.30 - - 15 15 $709,610 
Total 1,265 1,581 1,581 4,427 $7,679,482 
Note: The total number of fishermen by tier may not add up correctly due to merging of cells for confidentiality purposes. 
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Appendix C - Verification Plots and Other Payment Plan for 
Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers 
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Figure C.1  Plot of the Cubic Clustering Criterion for the Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers 
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Figure C.2  Hierarchical Tree Diagram for the Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers 
 
Note: Vendor_ID represents seafood dealers’ identification numbers.  The area below the tree diagram blacks out because it contains a very large number (4,427) of Vendor_ID.   
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Figure C.3  Plot of Principal Component Scores for the Wholesale/Retail Seafood Dealers 
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Table C.1  Minimum-Purchases-Based Alternative Compensation Plan for Wholesale / Retail Seafood Dealers Who 
Participated in the Cooperative Research Program 
Cluster and Recommended (New) 
Payment Amount 
Number of Dealers by Original Tier and Payment 
Amount 
Number of 
Dealers by 
Cluster 
Amount of 
Payment per 
Cluster Cluster New Pay 
New Pay - 
Original Pay 
Tier 1               
($1,437.91) 
Tier 2        
($4,678.05) 
Tier 3     
($43,814.97) 
A $515.73 
$-4,162.32 - 25 - 
120 $61,888 
$-922.18 95 - - 
B $527.38 
$-4,150.67 - 4 - 
20 $10,548 
$-910.53 16 - - 
C $1,157.75 $-3,520.30 - 94 - 94 $108,829 
D $7,732.69 
$-36,082.28 - - 29 
49 $378,902 
$3,054.64 - 20 - 
E $23,189.73 $-20,625.24 - - 74 74 $1,716,040 
F $124,310.39 $80,495.42 - - 38 38 $4,723,795 
Total 113 141 141 395 $7,000,000 
Note: The total number of dealers by tier may not add up correctly due to merging of cells for confidentiality purposes. 
 
 
 
